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bstract. Even if one could not say that governments and international 
organizations took the most appropriate rescue and/or stimulus packages, 
the worst effects of the financial crisis seem to be overcome. Signs of 
recovery occurred in the developed countries by the end of 2009, but the 
question of sustainability is arising. Romania was hit hard by the crisis in 2009, 
suffering a severe contraction of the economy, estimated at 7.1 percent. The 
worsening of the external and internal financial framework of Romania and the 
danger of a currency market crisis urged the need for a financing agreement with 
IMF. The study shows that, more or less, the parameters adapted for Romania 
regarding the MLT external debt sustainability entered already the significant risk 
zone. In the baseline scenario, assuming favourable economic circumstances, 
an exit of Romania from this risk zone could be possible by 2015. In the 
alternative scenario, an excessive burden of external debt compared with 
financing resources needed to comply with the external payments obligations 
would maintain Romania on the brink of default risk. Supplementary risks 
associated with unfavourable developments of the external context and also with 
pressures coming from a non-restructured public debt could make the default 
situation even unavoidable.     
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1. Introduction  
The turbulences on the international financial markets arising from the US 
housing market crisis which emerged in July 2007 have turned drastic in the 
second half of 2008. Despite expectations of an intervention by the Federal 
Reserves and/or the U.S. government for its rescue, only one week after the 
nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, two giants of the financial world, 
in mid-September 2008 the investment bank Lehman Brothers, a reference 
name on the capital markets, has been left to fall into bankruptcy, which has 
degenerated into the slump of the stock exchanges capitalization indices all over 
the world. Investors’ confidence in the capability of markets to automatically 
adjust its dysfunctions has drastically fallen and the risk of unemployment and 
poverty as consequences of the global crisis could severely damage the political 
and social framework, particularly in the less developed countries.  
The processes of globalization and liberalization of trade and free capital 
movement have proved to be factors, although we cannot say that they have 
caused, yet they at least favoured the uncontrolled spread of financial 
derivatives, including bad mortgage-backed securities, which became “toxic” 
assets. In the absence of adequate financial transactions control and supervision 
of global risk monitoring and warning, the protection systems at national level 
have failed one after the other, posing low resistance to the crisis power 
expansion and contamination. The secondary capital markets and their indexes 
of market capitalization, respectively, have suffered a fall-down to 20 percent in 
only a few weeks (end of September and the first half of October 2008).  
It is worth mentioning that, during the years leading up to the crisis, the monetary 
axis of the planet dangerously slipped from the West to the East, under the 
pressures of global financial imbalances deepening due to the accumulation, on 
one hand, of huge international reserves in Asia (mainly China and Japan) and, 
on the other hand, of huge debt in the USA which generated uncontrolled capital 
flow movements.     
To address the adverse effects of the financial crisis it is absolutely necessary to 
identify the causes that have generated it and to implement policies and 
resources coherently connected on short, medium and long terms, at the local, 
regional, national and international level. The crisis that the world is going 
through reveals the combination of traditional causes of the economic and 
financial crisis in general, with other non-traditional, specific ones.  
Among the main traditional reasons of the economic and financial crisis one 
finds: the credit boom on excessively large scale; the sharp rise in asset prices,  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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particularly in the housing market; lending over the exposure limits to economic 
agents or persons less solvent or even non-solvent (the sub-prime mortgage 
debtors); the failure in market discipline; the distortion of risk information and 
asset pricing.  
Regarding the non-traditional reasons, especially the ones related to the financial 
crisis, we can mention, first of all, the extent and depth of the sub-prime crisis 
concerning: the uncontrolled growth of a sui generis origin-and-distribute model; 
an inordinate appetite for profit that has fuelled the growth in demand for high 
risk assets; the ex ante ignorance and ex post uncertainty regarding the risk 
associated with stock market values, based on mortgages, derivative financial 
products and credit-default swaps transactions; the lack of an appropriate 
corporate governance and the excessive incentives for the financial institutions’ 
managers.  
In our opinion, the root cause of the international financial crisis lies in 
exacerbating the role of financial instruments, of the nominal (monetary) 
economy compared to the real economy, in terms of ensuring the prerequisites 
for a sustainable development. This exacerbation was based on the speculative 
component of the free market economy model, beyond its admissible and 
controllable limits. 
In order to restore the world financial stability and to avoid the collapse of global 
economy, a number of leading banks and financial institutions in difficulty have 
been saved, at least temporarily, by state intervention in the USA, the UK, 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries, through bailout 
rescue packages amounting to almost USD 5,000 billion. These huge public 
costs suggested the need for a systemic plan in order to strengthen financial 
institutions, taking into account the fact that certain actions fragmentized at 
national level may prove ineffective. Thus, a more intensive cooperation of the 
stakeholders in the stabilization and consolidation of financial markets seem 
appropriate, particularly for the implementation of reforms on regulation and 
supervision of financial markets. Any postponement of the implementation of 
reforms in this area may prove counterproductive in the medium and long run. 
The turbulences in international financial markets and their negative effects 
triggered a contraction of the world economy in 2009, estimated at 0.6 percent 
(IMF, 2010), sharper in the USA (2.4 percent), Euro area (4.1 percent) and 
Japan (5.2 percent). Influent international institutions or organizations (including 
UN, World Bank, IMF, EU, etc.), during various high level meetings of the 
Member States have discussed and agreed on a series of measures for Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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counteracting the effects of the crisis and restoring the confidence in financial 
markets. Although we cannot say that there is a miracle solution ("one-size-fits- 
all"), some of the experts have envisaged the consistent, clear and coordinated 
approach to the issues of security bank liabilities, separation of bad assets and 
recapitalization of the institutions concerned. The idea of systemic plans for 
safeguarding the financial markets by increasing the prudence, the supervision 
and the institutional regulation is more and more accredited. From this viewpoint 
emerges clearly the role of public-private partnerships in the financial sector, 
reducing the rate of exclusiveness of regulation solely by the market forces.  
To understand and motivate better possible solutions we must classify the 
effects of the crisis according to their action on short-and long term, respectively, 
this issue depending on the duration of the crisis, on one hand, and its economic 
and social consequences, on the other hand. In analyzing the effects of the crisis 
in the context of coherent anti-crisis programs and measures we must take into 
account not only their negative side but also the opportunities created by the 
process of "creative destruction" that must be highlighted.  
Putting in place emergency measures such as the limitation of borrowing through 
specific means is mostly meant to overcome the financial crisis on short term. In 
turn, the implementation of structural reforms within the global financial system 
on long term aims at preventing the recurrence of such crisis phenomena in the 
future, and requires special measures. A better regulatory and monitoring 
framework should be designed to help the speeding-up of financial innovation for 
the benefit of everybody and not for speculative purposes, by favouring a social 
minority.  
On the agenda of the governments, as challenges for debates and exchange of 
experience, pointing to a long-run horizon are, to varying degrees, financial 
issues related to competition, incentives for prudent behaviour, consumers’ 
protection, the improvement of financial education and of corporate governance.  
At global level, on the occasion of the high level Summit of G-20 (Washington, 
November 2008), the Member Countries committed to an Action Plan which was 
reviewed at G-20 London Summit in April 2009. The Action Plan set 
recommendations in order to strengthen transparency and accountability, 
enhance sound regulation, promote integrity in financial markets, reinforce 
international cooperation and reform international financial institutions.  
During the G-20 Summit which was held on 24-25th September in Pittsburgh 
(USA) the world leaders recognized that the process of world recovery and 
turnaround was incomplete, in many countries unemployment remaining  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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unacceptably high and the private demand still weak. As a consequence, they 
agreed further actions to assure a sound recovery from the global economic and 
financial crisis, among which: launching a Framework for Strong, Sustainable 
and Balanced Growth, setting timetables for the reform of the global financial 
system, mainly by raising capital standards and ending practices that lead to 
excessive risk-taking, establishing the Financial Stability Board at the G-20 level, 
in order to coordinate and monitor progress in strengthening financial regulation. 
European leaders discussed also the idea of an EU institution charged with the 
coordinated financial supervision of capital markets in Europe (watchdog) getting 
some politicians express their concern about the functioning of the market 
economy, in terms of intervention measures and protectionist constraints, 
including the banking system. The powers of a new European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) and European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) still have 
to be agreed upon and defined in detail. Despite the unity of action displayed by 
the European leaders, there is an impression that, in fact, each one is trying to 
minimize the negative effects on their own account, within their national space.  
Paradoxically, despite the insignificant proportion of toxic assets in their banking 
system, the emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe, escaped from an 
experimental system of command economy and going through a transition to a 
market economy, have also been exposed to the effects of the crisis, mainly due 
to their excessive openness to the foreign capital, including the financial one, 
sometimes of pure speculative nature.  
The effects of the crisis on emerging European countries in 2009 have been 
multiplied by their super-positioning to the persistent inflationary pressures 
caused by the rise of energy, raw materials and agricultural products global 
prices during 2007 until the second half of 2008. Moreover, in this context, a 
flight of foreign capital has been noticed, some of these countries facing a sharp 
depreciation of their currencies and the decline of investors’ appetite, which 
resulted in increasing external financial imbalances.  
2. Theoretical considerations and international practice 
in analyzing debt sustainability  
In the economic literature, but also in the international practice there is some 
consensus on the idea that, in developing countries, depending on the efficiency 
of external loans/credits, reasonable levels of external indebtedness may help 
the economic growth by accumulation of capital and by productivity growth. On 
the other hand, the over-indebtedness, that is a high level of external debt on Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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medium and long term, potentially unsustainable, can be a brake on 
technological progress of that country, having adverse effects on growth, the 
transmission channel being visible upon the public investment and the physical 
capital accumulation. An excessive burden of the external debt is acting in a 
vicious circle, i.e. the higher the degree of indebtedness, the more complicated 
the process of economy financing becomes, including supplementary costs of 
debt refinancing, which finally could even lead to halting the economic growth of 
that country and to slip into default.  
Some studies have estimated that, for countries with an average degree of 
indebtedness, doubling the debt is reducing the annual growth by 1 percentage 
point on long term (C. Pattillo and others, 2004).  
The analysis of non-linearity in the relationship external debt-economic growth has 
pointed out that, at low levels of the debt/GDP ratio, there is a positive influence on 
growth but at high levels of this ratio a negative impact has been revealed. The 
analysis of the data for a group of countries during 1968-1998, showed that the 
average impact of debt on GDP per capita growth becomes negative at levels of 
160-170 percent of debt to exports ratio and of 35-40 percent of debt to GDP ratio. 
According to other studies (B. Clements and others, 2003), the negative marginal 
effects on growth start to occur at even lower levels of public and publicly 
guaranteed external debt, i.e. at 20-25 percent of GDP.  
The over-dimensioning of debt is producing "overhang effects" on economic growth 
by discouraging investment (as level and structure) due to a possible threat of 
increasing taxes in the future, under the constraints of debt repayment obligations, 
which would affect the ex-ante efficiency parameters related to those investments 
(see Hennessy, 2004). The same effects can affect the macroeconomic stability 
because of the currency depreciation, of the fiscal deficit increase, of inflation and 
of uncertainties induced by the high level of indebtedness (Arnone M. and others, 
2005).  
Stopping or slowing debt growth as a form of external debt relief should be taken 
into consideration by the decision makers for the next years. This approach is 
totally in contrast with non-altruistic politicians and groups of interest concerned 
rather with their narrow and short-term objectives than with improving well-being. 
The politicians are inclined to finance their short-term particular interest of re-
election by booming the consumption or meeting the pressure of short-term 
requirements of the economy salvation.  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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The 200-year-old concept in economics of “Ricardian equivalence”1 supported by 
a reduced but outstanding number of economists holds under certain conditions:  
•  the presence of the so-called altruist intergenerational decision makers who 
consider that a debt redistributes resources from future to current generation;  
•  the intergenerational transfer have not to be detrimental to future generation ; 
•  the existence of perfect capital markets which is not the case in our times of 
rapid changes; 
•  the presence of non-distortionary (lump sum) taxation (a distortionary taxation 
reduces incentives to invest or work, the level of distortions growing with the 
higher tax increase). 
When most debt is denominated in foreign currency, higher levels of debt are 
generating constraints on the conduct of an independent monetary policy. The 
public debt management has to design policies aiming at reducing vulnerability 
of volatile capital markets, costly debt and financial crisis.  
Although rising indebtedness is directly linked to the increase of default risk, 
recent studies show that the debt level is not the crucial factor of sovereign debt 
risk (Manasse, Roubini, Schimmelphenning, 2003). The quality of national 
economy, of political and institutional bodies and of the government is among the 
most important debt factors. 
High debt levels are not associated with robust long-term growth when high-
return investment projects are not guaranteed. The complex interaction between 
economic growth and foreign debt has to be evaluated through the potential rate 
of investment returns. A higher investment return will generate a country’s better 
off and the necessary means to repay the debt obligations.  
The defining elements of a sovereign debt crisis scenario – manifested as the 
situation of non-payment of due amounts at a given maturity – are the 
downgrading of the country rating, the currency crisis, the calling for loans from 
the IMF, and foreign capital flight. Typically, this crisis is followed (sometimes 
preceded) by restructuring or rescheduling the external debt. The problems of 
external payment overheating are affecting also the private sector, limiting its 
access to the capital markets and raising the borrowing costs. On the other 
hand, none of the pressures related to external payments could be without 
impact on economic growth on different time horizons. 
                                                 
1 According to Ricardo, a government’s debt-financed tax cut is leading to higher taxes in the 
future, meaning only a postponement and not a reduction in the overall tax volume. Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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After 1990, when many emerging countries received access to international capital 
markets, the risk that a sovereign debt crisis of a particular country causes chain 
reactions has increased considerably, as it happened in the case of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998, when the effect of payment difficulties arising in 
Thailand have spread almost in the entire region. Wrongful government actions 
have reputational effects on confidence, affecting not only the sovereign debt, but 
also the international trade and investments, an entry into payment crisis inducing 
catastrophic effects on that country, as shown in the model of Cole and Kehoe 
(1998).  
So, the main issue to prevent and avoid a payment crisis situation at sovereign 
level is to accurately assess the risk of default, respectively the external debt 
sustainability. By sustainability, in this case, is understood the external financial 
situation of a country where foreign exchange resources are beyond the external 
debt service payment obligations. The longer the time horizon of the evaluation 
that corresponds better to the purpose of analysis is, the more difficult it 
becomes, due to the multiplication factors of uncertainty.  
Under the common framework of the IMF and World Bank methodology (IMF, 
2008), the debt sustainability analysis, applicable to the public and highly 
indebted countries, is built on 3 pillars:  
I.   Analysis of debt dynamics and prospects of debt service in the context of 
a baseline scenario, the alternative scenarios and stress tests standardized. 
Alternative scenarios have in view the assessment of a country's vulnerabilities 
to deviations from the baseline scenario and to various plausible shocks. 
Methodologically, the external debt covers only the long term, is defined on the 
basis of residence and may include the domestic debt denominated in foreign 
currency (especially in the case of countries where its level is very high).  
II.   Debt sustainability assessment based on debt service in relation to 
measuring the ability to pay. Debt stock indicators provide a measure of the 
total future debt burden, estimated by measuring its present value at a certain 
discount rate and the ability to pay is measured by GDP, exports of goods and 
services and/or budget revenues. Debt service indicators (at present value, 
discounted at a constant rate) relative to exports, respectively budget revenues, 
are reflecting the burden of future payment obligations of a country, highlighting 
the risks of insolvency on the long run and providing an indication of the 
likelihood of locating in time the liquidity problems. The perspective considered 
takes into account the debt maturity, which is of 10-20 years.   Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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III.  Recommendations on the borrowing strategy in order to limit the risk of 
payment problems; the risk is rated according to how present and future 
indicators of external debt are related to the thresholds of the base scenario, 
the alternative scenarios, and stress tests, hence:  
−  Low risk: all the indicators are well below the thresholds. If one indicator 
is above a certain threshold it should be checked if it is a matter of 
sustainability;  
−  Moderate  risk: when the base scenario indicates the exceeding of 
thresholds and the alternative scenarios or stress tests show a significant 
increase in the level of debt service indicators on the projected period;  
− High risk: base scenario indicates the exceeding of thresholds of debt 
and/or debt service, and alternative scenarios or stress tests also show an 
exacerbation of level indicators;  
−   Statement of payment problems: debt and debt service ratio are 
significantly above the thresholds; the existence of payments delays 
suggests that the country is in default, except when there are reasons, other 
than the burden of debt service, for which payments are not made.  
Starting from the fact that sustainable levels of external debt are influenced by 
the quality of policies and institutions, to assess their performance the World 
Bank calculates the CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) Index by 
3 categories of countries (with strong, medium and weak policy), the final 
classification into various categories of risk depending also on the score obtained 
by this index.  
According to some opinions (D. Gray and others, 2008), the traditional analysis 
of external debt sustainability presents a number of weaknesses due to the fact 
that a growth in the debt/GDP ratio does not necessarily mean an unsustainable 
debt dynamics. Moreover, the stabilization of the debt/GDP ratio is not sufficient 
if, for example, the level at which it stabilizes is too high (possibly unsustainable). 
Some studies have shown that the threshold of sustainability of external debt for 
the emerging countries ranges from 15-20 percent to 50-60 percent of GDP, 
whereas for the developed countries it can rise up to 350 percent of GDP, with 
an average of 85 percent (Reinhart and others, 2003).  
The traditional approach does not take into account the level and the changes in 
public sector assets and liabilities that affect the sustainability of debt and does not 
consider also the international reserves level. In defining the macroeconomic 
parameters that determine the debt sustainability, it does not take into account the Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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volatile nature of markets, and it is based on assumptions regarding the evolution of 
economic growth, the real interest rates and the exchange rates. The markets’ 
volatility may increase both on account of political shocks and the exogenous 
shocks, and a higher volatility in emerging countries compared with the advanced 
countries may be due to their limited ability to increase taxes and to their uncertain 
tax base. As Catao and Kapur (2006) pointed out, the external volatility of 
international trade has also a significant impact on the likelihood of payments’ 
default.  
The experiences of many countries concerning the external debt sustainability 
suggests that, for monitoring the vulnerability to insolvency, currency and liquidity 
risks, analysing the debt structure depending on interest rates and currency 
composition is extremely important. It was noted that, for example, economies that 
have a higher share of debt with variable interest rate in the total debt are more 
vulnerable to sudden increases in interest rates. In recent years, fluctuations in 
exchange rates, especially of the U.S. dollar (in the sense of its depreciation) have 
created relevance problems concerning the level of the overall external debt 
denominated in a particular currency. Consequently, it considers that information on 
the composition by currency and interest rates is absolutely necessary for a correct 
assessment of debt sustainability, through an appropriate currency conversion and 
by calculating a weighted average of interest due on that debt, respectively.  
An appropriate public debt management requires consistent management of 
risks associated with debt portfolio, that is refinancing risk (the inability to 
refinance debt or excessive increase its costs), currency risk (increase in foreign 
debt due to currency depreciation), interest rate risk (rise in interest on domestic 
or international capital markets), credit risk (bankruptcy of counterparts), the 
payment risk (errors in the payment system), operational risk (error of debt 
management system or human error, lack of appropriate procedures, lack of 
staff) and legislative risk (interpretation of the law).  
3. Romania’s vulnerabilities under the global crisis impact.  
Was the IMF financial assistance unavoidable? 
The global crisis has severely affected the real economy, in 2009 the gross 
domestic product of Romania falling by 7.1 percent compared with 2008. The 
exports fell by almost 14 percent and the imports by 32 percent. The 
manufacturing sector, whose main branches are under the majority control of 
foreign capital and subsidiaries of multinational corporations, being more 
exposed to international markets, witnessed a 6.5 percent contraction.  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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Constructions and retail trade registered also a sharp decline (more than 15 
percent and respectively 10 percent) in comparison with their "boom" in previous 
periods. The financial sector recorded a significant fall (more than 5 percent). 
Even if bankruptcies of banks did not occur, the lending activity entered a 
deadlock.  
The financial framework of Romania, both internal and external, deteriorates 
under the pressure of the state budget widening due to diminishing revenues and 
rising public sector expenditure and of the decline of foreign exchange incomes 
due to the falling exports. 
The biggest challenge for the prospects of Romania’s development is related, in 
our view, to the sustainability of the external financial situation revealed by the 
evolution of external debt both on short-, medium and long term (see Table 1).  
Under the circumstances of falling contribution of the autonomous flows (foreign 
direct investments) for covering the current account deficit and the increase of 
compensatory flows (external loans), the medium and long-term external debt of 
Romania has risen more than three times over the last six years, exceeding EUR 
51.7 billion at the end of 2008. The short-term external debt has increased even 
faster, almost seven times in six years, mainly due to the boom in imports and 
consumption credits. But an excessive rise of the short-term external debt puts 
great pressure on the currency market, risking a crash of the national currency in 
2009.  
Table 1  
The short, medium and long term external debt of Romania  
in the period 2003-2009 
       - EUR billion - 
External  debt  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
TOTAL  18.4 21.5 30.9 41.2 58.3 72.4 80.1 
-  short term  2.7  3.2  6.3  12.6 19.8 20.6 14.6 
- medium and long term  15.7 18.3 24.6 28.6 38.5 51.8 65.5 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Interactive Databank. 
 
On the other hand, the accumulation of a large foreign debt in the medium and 
long run, accompanied by high levels of annual services, weakened the 
international position of Romania, undermining its sustainable development. The 
medium and long-term external debt of Romania continued to grow in 2009, Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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mainly due to the loan from IMF and other international organizations, reaching 
EUR 65.5 billion at the end of December. 
To deal with the financial difficulties in 2009, increased by the consequences of 
the global crisis, Romania has concluded a financing agreement for a two-year 
loan of EUR 20 billion with IMF, EU, EBRD and World Bank, under the 
conditions of reducing the budget deficit and freezing wages in the public sector. 
Regarded as a "safety belt", the loan was intended to support the budget deficit 
and economic activity, to maintain the euro-lei exchange rates at sustainable 
levels for the economy and population and to boost the recovery of lending 
activity. The financial assistance and the economic policies are supposed to 
cope with liquidity pressures ou the short run, to improve competitiveness and to 
redress the macroeconomic and financial balances.  
The real causes of the accelerated increase in Romania’s external financing 
requirements are related to growing vulnerabilities of the financial situation which 
resulted from deepening macroeconomic imbalances, particularly the savings-
investments balance, from pressures on the external balance of payments 
emerged in recent years due to the deterioration of the current account and to 
the widening of trade deficit. The excessive increase in domestic private credit 
for consumption has fuelled the massive increase in imports, mainly in 2007 and 
2008. At the same time, reducing the relative contribution of foreign direct 
investment to financing the current account deficit has lead to increases ou 
short- and medium-long term of the external debt, mostly in the private sector 
(including banks).  
The deterioration of the current account during the last years is also explained by 
transfers the slowing of current from the Romanians working abroad and the 
increase in the income balance deficit, especially due to growing profits 
repatriation and/or reinvested by the foreign companies and also to increased 
interests related to the external debt. All these were accompanied by a modest 
rate of EU funds absorption in the first years of accession (about 10 percent), as 
despite its low level of development Romania being a net contributor to the EU 
budget.  
The gross financing requirements for 2009 estimated by the IMF and the 
National Bank of Romania, for EUR 44 billion, from which a financial gap of 
around EUR 12 billion  should be covered by an external loan, was not 
adequately sustained in our view, at least according to published sometimes 
contradictory or confusing information.   Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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For example, the estimation of foreign direct investments, i.e. EUR 3.5 billion in 
2009, has proved to be under-sized, compared with the previous year (EUR 9 
billion) and also with the real amount of FDI registered at the end of 2009 (EUR 
4.9 billion).  
In our opinion, under the circumstances of many uncertainties in the international 
environment, which could have assumed also the rebound of the world economy 
as of 2010, a financing agreement over a shorter period would have been more 
appropriate. In case the pessimistic assumptions about the Romanian economy 
would have been confirmed, an extension of this agreement could have been 
negotiated. However, a much more advantageous financing solution for Romania, 
as an EU member state, would have been the qualification for obtaining a credit 
line for 6 months or one year from FCL (“Flexible Credit Line”), a funding modality 
initiated by the IMF in the month of March 2009 for replacing SLF (“Short Term 
Liquidity Facility”). It is worth mentioning that, this new credit line is released for the 
prevention of crises in countries with very strong fundamentals, policies, and track 
records of policy implementation, which is not totally the case of Romania.  
In fact, in our view, the logic of the agreement with the IMF was based on 
monetary coordinates designed inside the NBR perimeter. Starting with the top 
priority of Romania's accession to the Euro Area in 2014 and thus of its entry into 
the ERM II (Exchange Rate Mechanism) in 2012, the strict conformity to 
convergence criteria (in particular those on inflation, nominal interest rates on 
long term and exchange rate) has become the fundamental objective in the 
medium and long run.  
The threat of a possible collapse of the national currency in the first quarter of 
2009, due to internal and external pressures accumulation doubled by the lack of 
immediate liquidity of assets in which the international reserves of Romania have 
been invested and also by the reduction of the minimum reserve requirements 
on foreign currency liabilities of the commercial banks could have triggered an 
uncontrolled inflation, missing the objective of joining the Euro area.  
The inconsistency of tax and fiscal policies of the government, mainly the 
excessive budget expenditures in 2008, has worried the monetary authorities of 
Romania, but also the European Commission. Under these circumstances, the 
central bank has been forced to resort to international arbitration for imposing the 
national fiscal discipline under a multilateral financing agreement: IMF, EU, 
EBRD and World Bank.  
The Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF provides a number of advantages for 
Romania, implementing the necessary fiscal and monetary policies, including the Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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fiscal discipline, ensuring the macroeconomic stability in the context of 
conditionality and performance criteria, improving the perception of foreign 
investors, stabilizing the foreign exchange market, ameliorating the predictability, 
sustainability and coherence of economic policies, supporting the banking sector 
and its strengthening, including the recovery of the lending activity, both for 
businesses and population.  
Beyond these advantages, there are also several risks arising from the 
agreement with the IMF, such as creating a negative image regarding the 
financial situation of Romania, which would make a "bailout" necessary, limiting 
the government room of manoeuvre in implementing various economic policies, 
including the predictable reduction in the budget allocation in accordance with 
national priorities, such as infrastructure development, export promotion and 
environment protection. The loan of about EUR 20 billion will push the external 
debt towards excessive levels, with annual services potentially unsustainable ou 
the medium and long run. The social effects generated by the loss of jobs, 
accompanied by the non-indexation of wages and pensions, can have adverse 
economic costs that are difficult to estimate. Any non-conformation of Romania 
to the conditions and performance criteria specified in the agreement, which 
involves postponements or, worse, cancellation of the next instalments, could 
lead to adverse effects on the economy, as well as on the prospects of 
sustainable development.  
A weak point of the procedures backing the agreement with the IMF was the lack 
of an alternative, for example compared with a loan from another country and/or 
with a launch of Romanian government bonds on national and international 
capital markets, considered too restrictive a priori. In this context, the 
comparative terms of loans could have been made known, so that one can be 
sure that the most advantageous borrowing alternative has been chosen. In this 
way, speculations around the conditionalities imposed by IMF and the 
confidentiality of certain clauses of the agreement could have been avoided, 
especially under the circumstances of increasing the financial system 
transparency, considered as a primary remedy for its recovery. 
According to the first review the Stand-By Arrangement, the report of IMF staff 
team, following discussions with the Romanian authorities ended in mid-August 
2009, underlined the contraction of economic activities, sharper than projected, 
due to the combination of an unfavourable external environment and faster 
retrenchment of domestic demand during the first half of 2009. The IMF experts 
brought many significant corrections to the macroeconomic framework projected 
6 months earlier, confirming our doubts previously mentioned regarding their  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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adequacy. For instance, the new figure for the gross financing requirements 
stood for EUR 41.5 billion (instead of EUR 44 billion) for 2009, respectively EUR 
2.5 billion less, following the corrections of current account deficit (down from 
EUR 9 billion to EUR 6.5 billion).  
The total financing resources were revised from EUR 32.2 billion up to EUR 34.5 
billion, mainly due to the corrections of net foreign direct investments estimation 
from EUR 3.5 billion to EUR 5 billion. The most significant change suffered the 
estimates for the increase of gross international reserves - rather an adjustment 
parameter - respectively from 0 to EUR 4.5 billion, which made the external 
financial gap (EUR 11.5 billion instead of EUR 11.8 billion) to remain almost the 
same, justifying in this way the amount of loan from the IMF and other 
international organizations. 
4. The assessment of Romania’s public and MLT external 
debt sustainability   
For Romania, the issue of appropriate management of debt, both internal and 
external, has become of acute importance in recent years, which witnessed a 
sharp growth in indebtedness, on one hand, on account of considerable budget 
deficits accumulation and on the other hand, due to the direct effects of the 
global crisis, which reduced foreign exchange earnings from exports and caused 
a decrease in FDI inflows, making the financing of the economy difficult and 
imposing a massive sovereign borrowing.  
First, we will examine the evolution of the public debt main indicators, trying to 
assess sustainability. According to a report of the Ministry of Finance, in the 
period 2000-2009, the total public debt (government and local authorities, 
internal and external, including state guarantees) rose more than three times in 
real terms, reaching, according to our estimates, about 30 percent of GDP at the 
end of 2009 (see Table 2).  
Even if this parameter is below the limit set by the Maastricht Treaty (i.e. 60 
percent of GDP), the fact that in just 4 years this share has almost doubled in the 
case of Romania, is a warning signal to the authorities, considering also an 
unfavourable internal economic context, which would rather suggest a further 
increase in the sovereign debt. It is worth mentioning that another indicator of 
public debt is deteriorating, the ratio of the debt to the exports of goods and 
services exceeding 100 percent in 2009 and falling already, according to 
international standards, in the area of a moderate risk of sustainability problems.  Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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Table 2 
Indicators of Romania’s public debt sustainability in the period 2001-2009 
Indicators/ 
Years  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  2009 
Public debt (as 
percentage) 
- in GDP 
- in Exports of 
G&S* 
 
 
28.7 
 
80.0 
 
 
28.9 
 
73.1 
 
 
26.0 
 
68.7 
 
 
22.5 
 
64.2 
 
 
20.5 
 
60.6 
 
 
18.4 
 
59.6 
 
 
20.3 
 
61.9 
 
 
21.8 
 
64.9 
 
 
30.1 
 
102.5 
*For 2009, own estimation. 
Source: For 2001-2008, Public Debt Report (in Romanian Language: Raport privind datoria 
publică), Ministry of Finance, June 2009; for 2009, data from Public Debt Bulletin, 
Ministry of Finance, December 2009.  
 
As we previously mentioned, in order to relieve the public debt sustainability, of 
crucial importance proves to be the examination of the debt portfolio structure, 
from data on Romania resulting that the main tendencies reflect a 
deterioration of its prospects. Thus, in terms of currency composition, it is 
noteworthy that, since 2007, when the public debt denominated in lei, with a total 
share of 53.2 percent, has exceeded for the first time the public debt 
denominated in foreign currencies, especially on account of increased needs for 
budget deficit financing, which happened also in 2008 and 2009. Although, in 
principle, this could be interpreted as a positive trend due to containing the 
currency risk, paradoxically, the financing costs in national currency were 
extremely high, especially due to rising inflation expectations. The government 
bonds were issued with a 10 percent annual interest, this high level being fuelled 
also by the volatility of international capital markets.  
On the other hand, changes in the structure of public debt by type of financial 
instruments reveals the effects of the Ministry’s of Finance application of a strategy 
aimed at extending the issue of government bonds and of their maturity (in 10, 
12 and even 15 years), which  intends also to relax the timetable for repayment. In 
the structure of debt by type of interest rate, there was a downward trend of the 
share of debt with fixed interest rate (to about 30 percent in 2009) and the 
corresponding increase in the share of debt with variable interest rate, which may 
affect in the future the public debt sustainability, especially in the case of an 
unfavourable evolution of financing costs.   Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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If we analyze the evolution of debt structure by categories of creditors, it is worth 
mentioning that the main and growing share (reaching over 80 percent in 2009) 
is held by private banks and other private creditors, this tendency being 
sustained also by the structural changes in public debt by type of financial 
instruments which have been previously mentioned. As some studies point out 
(Flassbeck and Panizza, 2008), this category of creditors present also the 
highest risk in terms of long-term sustainability of debt, i.e. the likelihood of 
payment problems occurrence at Sovereign level.  
In conclusion, it can be said that in recent years there has been a rapid 
deterioration of the public debt sustainability parameters in Romania, 
including of the loan portfolio structure. The main factor determining the 
increase of domestic debt was the budget deficit accumulation, and, respectively, 
the foreign debt rise, due to borrowing from international organizations (IMF, EU, 
World Bank). It is worth mentioning that the external credit was partially used to 
finance the deficit budget, but also in order to support the currency market and 
the national currency exchange rate. If the measures agreed in the Stand-by 
Agreement will produce the desired results, turning back under control the 
consolidated budget deficit, we consider that there are not major risks ou the 
medium run about Romania's public debt sustainability.  
In other countries the government anti-crisis programs (including measures to 
increase public investments, tax relief, financial packages supporting companies 
and/or financial and banking institutions with liquidity problems, etc.) significantly 
affected the fiscal framework (in the EU countries for 2009, estimating a budget 
deficit of about 7 percent of GDP), which allowed, to a large extent, the absorption 
of the global crisis effects and the economic recovery of these countries starting in 
late 2009. But the costs of these programs have a deep impact on the public debt, 
which, for example, in EU countries has increased, as a proportion of GDP, from 
61.5 percent in 2008 to 73 percent in 2009, and in 2010 it is estimated to approach 
even to 80 percent. The case of Greece, which accumulated almost EUR 300 
billion public debt (117 percent of GDP) at the end of 2009, became dramatic 
during the first months of 2010, without the financial assistance from EU and IMF, 
risking an exit from Eurozone and even a sovereign debt default.  
It should be noted that in Romania not the financing of anti-crisis measures - in fact, 
almost nonexistent - has caused the fiscal deficit widening, but rather the covering 
of the financing needs of an oversized public sector and of supporting the social 
security budget. Moreover, the poor management of the public finance has led to 
partially blocking the economy through the creation of arrears, that is payment 
delays to the companies, which generated a chain reaction.  
Thus, we consider that delays in economic recovery of Romania could lead, 
while maintaining the current pace of the public debt deterioration, to exceeding Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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the critical threshold of 60 percent of GDP in only 4-5 years, i.e. just around the 
period in which Romania is preparing to join the Euro Area.  
In terms of country risk analysis, the debt sustainability assessment should be 
consistent with that of total foreign debt, which, in the case of Romania, 
experienced a dramatic evolution over the past decade. According to its 
structural configuration, the Romanian economy’s development is dependent on 
imports, implying the deterioration in the trade and current account balances, as 
the economic growth rate is higher.  
Under these circumstances, as we have mentioned before, the external debt on 
medium and long term increased from a level below EUR 10 billion in 2000 to 
EUR 65 billion at the end of 2009. At the same time, the short-term external debt 
increased from a level below EUR 2 billion in 2000 to over 20 billion EUR in 
2008, followed by a decline to about EUR 15 billion at the end of 2009.  
In this study we are focusing ou the long-term sustainability of the external 
financial framework, which does not mean that the short-term external debt 
sustainability is less important. Our main reasons are that, on one hand, 
methodologically, one could not analyse the merger of medium and long-term 
debt with the short-term debt, because of their different nature, and, on the other 
hand, if a short-term external balance could be, more or less, easily adjusted, on 
long term this correction becomes much more difficult, which is requiring another 
approach.  
Starting from the fact that the short-term external debt is predominantly related to 
the trade receivables, with limited influence on the overall long-term financial 
situation of a country, bearing however in mind that Romania has felt acutely the 
short-term debt pressures on the currency market in the spring of 2009 - which 
partially motivated the IMF financial assistance - we will continue our analysis 
focusing on MLT external debt, seeking an assessment of its sustainability.  
As it can be noticed in the data presented in Tables 3 and 4, the main 
parameters for assessing the sustainability of the MLT external debt 
recorded an unfavourable trend in the period 2000-2009, being at present at 
the limit or beyond the threshold of sustainability. 
The thresholds proposed by us are indicative, their setting having in view the 
vulnerabilities of Romania in conditions of crisis, considering only partially the 
international standards (mainly, of the rating agencies). Also, we specify that 
they represent rather a zone delimitation (in the sense of warning levels under 
the circumstances of maximum caution) than a qualification assessment scale.  
The MLT external debt to GDP ratio increased from 23.9 percent to 37.6 percent 
in 2008, making a sharper leap in 2009 when this ratio reached 54.9 percent, it is 
true, under the circumstances of a GDP contraction by more than 7 percent this 
last year.  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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Table 3 
Indicators of external financial framework of Romania  
in the period 2000-2009 
Indicators/Years  2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MLT External Debt  (EUR  bn)  9.6 18.3 24.6 28.6 38.5 51.8 65.5 
MLT External Debt Service 
(EUR  bn)  2.2 3.8 4.8 6.1 7.5  12.1  11.4 
Gross Domestic Product* (EUR 
bn)  40.2 60.7 79.7 97.8  123.6  136.8  117.0 
GDP real growth  (percent)  2.1 8.4 4.1 7.9 6.2 7.1 -7.1 
Exports of Goods &Services 
(EUR  bn)  13.2 21.8 26.4 31.4 36.5 42.4 36.0 
Forex Earnings  (EUR  bn)  14.7 25.5 31.7 38.7 46.1 53.4 43.8 
Forex Reserves  (EUR  bn)  5.2 13.1 18.3 22.9 27.2 28.3 30.9 
* For 2009, estimation of the National Commission for Prognosis.  
Source: National Bank of Romania, National Commission for Prognosis.  
Table 4 
Indicators of Romania’s MLT external debt sustainability  
in the period 2000-2009 
- percent - 
Indicators/Years 2000  2006  2007  2008  2009  Threshold 
External Debt /GDP  23.9  29.2  31.1  37.9  56.0  50.0 
External Debt/Exports G&S  72.7  91.2  105.5  122.2  181.9  150.0 
External Debt/ Forex Earnings  65.3  73.9  83.5  97.0  149.5  100.0 
Forex Reserves/External Debt  54.2  80.0  70.6  54.6  47.2  50.0* 
External Debt Service/Forex 
Earnings 
15.0 15.8 16.3  22.7  26.0  20.0 
External Debt Service /Exports G&S  16.7  19.4  20.5  28.5  31.7  30.0 
External Debt Service /Forex 
Reserves 
42.3 26.6 27.6  42.8  36.9  40.0 
Forex Reserves/GDP  12.9  23.4  22.0  20.7  26.4  25.0* 
*Minimum threshold 
Source: Calculations based on Table 3 data. 
 
Compared with the foreign exchange earnings, in our opinion the most important 
indicator as a sustainability prerequisite, the ratio of MLT external debt rose 
above the threshold of 100 percent in 2009 and compared with the exports of 
goods and services the ratio stood well above the threshold of 150 percent. In Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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this context, it should be noted that the export sector in Romania was one of the 
most affected by the global crisis in 2009, which had a direct impact on the 
decrease in foreign exchange earnings for this year.  
Even the proportion of international foreign exchange reserves in GDP increased 
from 12.9 percent to over 25 percent in the period under review, but compared 
with the external debt, they fell for the first time below 50 percent in 2009. 
Regarding the international reserves it should be noted, however, that their lack 
of immediate liquidity, in the case of Romania, implies a certain deficit of their 
relevance in the analysis of external debt sustainability. These reserves are 
largely invested in government bonds issued by developed countries (including 
the Treasury of the USA), with an uncertain market value under the 
circumstances of international financial crisis and the volatility of capital markets.  
The ratio of the external debt service to the foreign exchange earnings reached 
26 percent in 2009 (compared with 15 percent in 2000) and in relation to exports 
of goods and services it increased continuously during the considered period, 
reaching more than 31 percent in 2009. It is also noteworthy that the external 
debt per capita increased from only EUR 427 in 2000 to more than EUR 3000 in 
2009, which represents already a significant debt burden upon the population of 
Romania and its future generations. 
Table 5 
Average annual growth rate of some indicators of MTL  
External Debt Sustainability 
                                                                                                              - percent - 
Average annual growth   2001-2008  2001-2009 
MLT External Debt  23.4  23.8 
GDP real growth  6.2  4.6 
Exports of Goods & Services  15.7  11.8 
Forex Earnings  17.5  12.9 
Source: Calculations based on Table 3 data. 
 
The analysis of the indicators in terms of the average annual growth rate during 
2001-2008 and 2001-2009 respectively, revealed that the degradation of the 
MLT external debt sustainability parameters has been caused by exceeding 
the external debt rate (23 percent annually), compared with the GDP real growth 
rate, by about 17-18 percentage points, and the export of goods and services 
and forex earnings, by about 8-10 percentage points respectively (see Table 5).  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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The comparison between the two periods of analysis has revealed that, although 
the year 2009 did not change the trends, it produced a shock upon the data 
series, especially concerning exports and forex earnings, with a differential of 
about 4 percentage points between the two average annual growth rates.  
The external debt of Romania was by far the indicator that has registered the 
highest growth rate during 2001-2009, compared with other outcome indicators 
such as GDP, exports and foreign exchange earnings. The ratio between the 
average growth rate of external debt and the average growth rate of GDP, 
exports and forex earnings was much higher during 2005-2009 than during 
2001-2004, which reveal an unfavourable trend taking into account also the 
circumstances of international crisis (see Table 6). If this trend is going further 
there can be growing difficulties and pressures generated by Romania’s external 
debt repayment upon economic growth, investments and welfare.  
Table 6 
The ratio between the average annual growth rate of MLT  
external debt and those of  GDP, exports of G&S and forex earnings  
of Romania in 2001-2009  
Indicators 2001-2009  2001-2004  2005-2009 
MLT external debt /GDP  5.17  2.87  8.35 
MLT external debt /Exports of G&S  2.02  1.31  2.75 
MLT external debt /Forex earnings  1.84  1.18  2.54 
Source: Calculation based on Table 3 data. 
 
Such gaps on the horizon of one decade reveals that the external financing 
attracted on medium and long term has not generated major technological 
changes to ensure sound economic structures and sound growth, these 
vulnerabilities of Romania becoming obvious in 2009 by the lack of resistance to 
the global crisis impact. In this context, it should be noted that the main 
component of MLT external debt was the private sector, whose share in total 
debt increased from about one third in 2000 to over two thirds in 2008. In 2009, 
under the circumstances of the foreign debt increase mainly due to the IMF loan 
(EUR 6.6 billion), plus the increase of non-resident deposits to over EUR 7 
billion, this share has declined somewhat below 60 percent.       
Therefore, in the case of Romania, the accumulation of external debt mostly by 
the private sector has failed, at least for now, to generate effects ensuring a 
sustainable economic growth. Perhaps, this was due to the fact that, to a 
significant extent, the investments in this sector had a speculative component, Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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focusing on real estate, the secondary capital market, the banking sector, 
including non-resident deposits searching for the valorization of the interest rate 
differential on the primary capital market. 
In assessing debt sustainability, several methodological issues have to be 
considered, including the ones that show an undervaluation of the debt size 
comparing with the official data. The world economy globalization, which favored 
the liberalization and acceleration of goods and capital international flows, has 
been accompanied by the creation of significant statistical discrepancies, 
including external debt figures. In fact, Romania's foreign debt is greater than 
it appears in the records of the National Bank of Romania (NBR), one of the 
explanations relying on the financing of Romanian companies (many with foreign 
capital majority) directly from foreign banks located abroad, which are beyond 
the international financial flows registered by the NBR. Although some of this 
financing are short-term loans (up to one year), others, more difficult to assess - 
but anyway amounting to several billion of euros annually - have a maturity of 
more than one year, belonging then to Romania's total foreign debt.  
Moreover, as specified in NBR statistics, the MLT external debt represents its stock 
in a given moment, not including all payments related to the debt repayments 
(interests, fees, penalties, etc.). Under the circumstances of missing information on 
foreign debt repayment schedule, if we add also the cross-border loans directly to 
Romanian companies that we have been mentioned before, it becomes obvious 
that, in reality, the payments related to the external debt are significantly higher 
than results from the official data. As a consequence, Romania's international 
financial position appears to be extremely fragile, remaining vulnerable to a rapid 
deterioration of the sustainability parameters because of possible future shocks, 
the sovereign risk topping rather the speculative area, as anyway our country is 
qualified by the major rating agencies.  
5. Scenarios of Romania’s external debt  
sustainability on time horizon 2010-2016  
Further, we are submitting two possible scenarios of Romania’s external debt 
sustainability on the time horizon 2010-2016, by comparson with the foreign 
exchange earnings, which are the main resource of fuelling the external 
payments due. Both scenarios were constructed based on the data series for the 
period 2000-2009, the projection for the period 2010-2016 being made by the 
regression functions of polynomial type, which responded most adequately to the 
correlation requirements with the real data series.  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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The baseline scenario assumes a limitation on the increase in the external debt 
stock over a threshold of EUR 70 billion in 2010, followed by a slight decrease in 
successive years, to the extent of achieving a positive annual balance of 
payments versus new loans (hypothesis close to the IMF's vision on the future 
development of Romania's external financial framework until 2014, as well as on 
the financial gap covering). For the indicator forex earnings we used, as a 
benchmark, the forecast of BoP current account balance prepared by the 
National Commission for Prognosis (see NCP, 2009). 
The equations in the case of Baseline Scenario are: 
The MLT external debt:         y = -0.28x² + 9.1583x - 10.259            (1) 
                                                        R² = 0.879 
The forex earnings:                 y = 0.0417x² + 4.1411x + 8.9544          (2) 
                                              R² = 0.9452 
where: y  represents the MLT external debt in the relation (1) and respectively 
the forex earnings in the relation (2);  
           x   represents the time (years 1,2…16); 
            R  represents the squared correlation coefficient. 
The trend of Romania's external debt and forex earnings in 2010-2016 
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As one could observe in Figure 1, in 2009 the external debt still exceeded the 
foreign earnings in absolute values, Romania entering the significant risk zone in 
terms of external financial framework sustainability. 
Assuming a desirable implementation of appropriate economic, fiscal and 
monetary policies, supported by restoring the confidence in business 
environment, including substantial investment inflows, able to help boosting the 
economic growth in a manner that would limit the MLT external debt, in 2015 
Romania could register an exceeding of its foreign debt level by that of its foreign 
earnings, as an essential prerequisite for ensuring the external payments 
sustainability. To the extent to which the other indicators recover up to 
sustainable levels, one may hope that Romania is getting out of the significant 
risk of external payment problems, especially on the time horizon of Euro Zone 
accession. 
The alternative scenario assumes an increase in the MLT external debt on time 
horizon 2010-2016 at an annual growth rate of around 6.0 percent (2 percentage 
points over the average GDP growth rate expected for this period). 
The equations in the case of the Alternative Scenario are: 
The MLT external debt:          y = 0.0677x² + 5.1824x – 2.3324             (3) 
                                                        R² = 0.9718 
The forex earnings:               y = -0.1037x² + 4.9027x + 7.3074     (4) 
                                                       R² = 0.9415 
As we could see in Figure 2, in the case where, for various reasons, a correction 
of the MLT external debt trend does not happen and if the forex earnings would 
enter a path less favorable than the forecast, Romania’s external payment 
sustainability would remain in the significant risk zone, i.e. payment problems 
and slippage into a financial crisis. This probability could be higher in the case of 
unfavorable external circumstances, and if pressures of the domestic debt 
accumulation unadjusted in time are added, this slippage would be even 
inevitable. 
Thinking that most of the external debt belongs to the private sector and this is 
relieving the government and the central bank decision makers of any obligation in 
the appropriate management of sovereign debt risk would be a fatal error for 
Romania. Due to ST and MLT external debt inter-connections (which became 
obvious during the spring of 2009, when the government had to borrow from 
international organizations in order to cover a huge demand, mostly private, on the  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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foreign exchange market managed by the central bank) and to financial links 
between private and public sectors (bailouts of strategic private companies by the 
government, arrears in public works payments, accumulation of nonperforming 
loans in retail/corporate lending) huge debt services without foreseeable own 
sources of gap financing, if the economy is not recovering as expected, create a 
heavy perspective of debt rollovers under more and more unfavourable conditions 
and implicitly on Romania’s external debt sustainability.  
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-------External debt data series     ── ─ ─ External debt regression  
 Forex earnings data series  ======= Forex earnings regression 
Figure 2 - The trend of Romania’s external debt and forex earnings in 2010-2016 
 
6. The absorption of EU structural funds, a pillar of debt 
sustainability?  
The structural funds (including cohesion funds) allocated to Romania from the 
EU budget for the scheduled period 2007-2013 are amounting to EUR 19.2 Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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billion, plus national co-financing (state budget, local budgets and private sector), 
amounting to around EUR 9 billion. The EU structural funds are implemented 
through five Sectoral Operational Programs (i.e. SOP, for: Transportation: EUR 
4.5 billion; Human Resources Development: EUR 3.4 billion; Increasing 
Economic Competitiveness: EUR 2.5 billion; Administrative Capacity 
Development: EUR 208 million; Environment: EUR 4.5 billion), Regional 
Operational Program (ROP, amounting to EUR 3.7 billion) and Operational 
Program for Technical Assistance (amounting to EUR 170 million).  
Out of the total structural and cohesion funds allocated to Romania for the period 
2007-2009, Romania's allocation amounted to EUR 5.64 billion (representing 
about 24.14 billion lei). According to the official data of the Authority for 
Coordination of Structural Instruments (see Table 7), by the end of December 
2009, payments made to beneficiaries (reimbursements) amounted to 2.5 billion 
lei (around EUR 600 million), which means an EU fund absorption rate of 10.3 
percent, that is a very low level. 
Table 7  
Structural fund absorption rate in Romania at the end of December 2009 
Number of projects*   
Operational 
Program 
EU 
Allocations 
2007-2009 
(Lei mil.) 
Reimbursed 
EU 
Contribution 
(Lei mil.) 
Absorption 
Rate 
(percent) 
 
Submitted 
 
Rejected 
 
Approved 
Regional 5029.4  790.0  15.3  3110  916  715 
Environment 5511.9  777.7  14.0  141  48  64 
Transportation 5595.1 134.5  2.4  41  6 20 
Increasing 
Economic 
Competitiveness 3124.7  513.7  16.4  5386  2069 1264 
Human 
Resources 4260.4  286.2  6.5  5250  3329  1691 
Development 
Administrative 
Capacity 381.5  6.1  1.6  931  152  111 
Development 
Technical 
Assistance 241.1  3.0  1.2  31  8  23 
TOTAL 24144.1  2511.3  10.3  14890  6528  3888 
*The difference between the projects submitted and rejected/approved is represented by the 
projects under assessment.  
Source: Press release regarding the Situation on 31st December 2009 of projects submitted 
and approved, of contracts signed and payments reimbursed to beneficiaries, ACIS, 
January 19, 2010.  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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It should be noted that in nearly 3 years, when Romania has contributed with 
more than EUR 3 billion to the Community budget, our country has managed to 
absorb only EUR 0.6 billion from EU structural funds, the status of net contributor 
(at a very unfavourable rate, i.e. of 6/1) is paradoxical for a country that has to 
close a significant development gap, whose time horizon seems to be removed.  
Within the operational programs’ structure, while SOP Increasing Economic 
Competitiveness has registered an absorption rate of more than 16 percent, in the 
case of SOP Human Resources Development the absorption rate was only about 
6.5 percent. The SOP Transportation, which in terms of funds allocated is the most 
important, was not able to absorb more than 2.4 percent. Out of the 14,890 total 
projects submitted only 3,888 were approved, i.e. only 1 out of 4, which is far from 
the expectations. Out of the 7 operational programs, the OP Regional, SOP 
Increasing Economic Competitiveness and SOP Human Resources Development 
concentrate about 94 percent of total approved projects, while compared to 
submitted projects for these programs the ratio is still 1/4.  
The causes of this situation are multiple, starting from the endemic inability of 
potential beneficiaries to develop viable projects, the excessive bureaucracy of 
management authorities, the great zeal in following the procedures, the long time 
and delays throughout evaluation-approval-signing financing contract-tendering-
reimbursement-implementation, the lack of performance criteria for consulting 
firms, the deficiencies in contractual relations between different institutions at the 
central and local level, between them and the consulting firms, and the project 
beneficiaries, etc.  
During the year of crisis 2009, when the absorption of structural funds was 
supposed to be the priority no. 1, as included in the new government program, 
the absorption rate remained as low. Although an inter-ministry committee for the 
management of EU funds was set up in the beginning of 2009 under the Prime 
Minister’s coordination, with a weekly periodicity of meetings, in time, they 
became more rarely, until their complete disappearance during the summer. We 
can say that government authorities, including the line ministries with 
responsibilities in managing the structural funds did not meet their commitments 
and obligations, the weak measures taken or declared failing to attract and 
absorb these funds.  
Furthermore, instead of having the structural funds support the development 
projects that contribute to mitigating the effects of economic crisis, it was their 
low absorption rate that blocked the development of many projects, due to the 
financial deterioration of eligible parameters of economic agents. Also, the Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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insufficient co-financing from the state budget (central and/or local) was caused 
by growing deficits. The large uncertainty degree of obtaining project pre-
financing from the banking system, which restricted credit conditions and 
increased its costs, changing the ex ante financial parameter projects (calculated 
in lei) by sharp domestic currency depreciation, led to the increased costs of 
implementation. All these were overlapped by the political crisis triggered in the 
autumn of 2009, which caused an institutional deadlock at the central and local 
government levels, including the Managing Authorities of European Funds.  
We believe that, in the years 2010-2013, the absorption of EU structural funds, 
including the recovery of allocations from previous years, is one of the pillars of 
the strategy to exit from the crisis. Regardless of the government political colour, 
the Romanian authorities have to make this key priority operational by decisive 
actions in order to remove blocking factors, many of which are mentioned above. 
As far as our country succeeds to attract structural funds, in addition to project 
implementation effects on the real economy, they may contribute also to the 
recovery of Romania's external balance, directly by reducing the financial gap, 
but also indirectly by increasing the financial resources (of state and private 
sector), implicitly to the payment of outstanding debt.  
Under the circumstances of public deficit worsening and of budgetary constraints 
following the global crisis impact, both at EU and national levels, a review of 
operational programs is expected, which could add supplementary difficulties in 
increasing the structural fund absorption rate in the case of Romania. 
7. Concluding remarks on the current economic crisis and 
the prospects of Romania 
The conditionalities of the external sustainability trend under the baseline 
scenario and the avoidance of threats induced by materializing the alternative 
scenario are multiple, involving an adjustment of the economy not only by 
eliminating the weaknesses demonstrated by the  inability to absorb the global 
crisis effects, but especially those that have remained for long. In our opinion, 
Romania would have entered anyway a financial crisis, given the rapid widening 
of external imbalances as a result of the accumulation of trade and current 
account deficits, simultaneously with the increasing needs to cover the financing 
gap through compensatory flows (foreign loans), as an effect of reducing the 
autonomous flows (FDI), to the extent of the depletion of privatize assets. 
Paradoxically, the fall of the economy in 2009 under the global crisis effects has 
caused a sudden and abrupt adjustment of the current account deficit (fully  Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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covered by foreign investments in 2009, even if it was reduced by almost half 
compared with the previous year), and rushed the call to the IMF financial 
assistance in order to avoid Romania’s entry into a currency market crisis, which 
would have degenerated into a resuscitation of inflation and undermining the 
timetable for joining the Euro Area. 
As mentioned above, these threats had existed before the surge of the global 
crisis, which only accelerated and accentuated the effects suffered by Romania, 
transformed into a real economic and financial shock: reducing the industrial 
production, construction sector and exports, paralysing the primary capital 
market and high volatility on secondary capital market, freezing the real estate 
market, reducing the household consumption and rising the unemployment, etc. 
One of the few anchors that saved Romania from a financial wreck was the 
exchange rate, supported, as mentioned before, by the IMF loan.  
If the maintenance of the exchange rate is sustainable in the medium and long 
run there still is a big dilemma regarding the Romanian economy. Through 
monetary and financial instruments, as we saw in the previous national and 
international experiences, without substantial support in the real economy, we 
can have delusions of short-term macro-stabilization and major disappointments 
in the medium and long run.  
Even if the delimitation of the causes that generated the economy’s sharp 
decline (i.e. specific to Romania/of foreign origin) became impossible, their 
overlapping being in fact frequent and extensive, it is obvious that, despite some 
performance criteria and indicative targets set by the agreement with the IMF, 
the hesitations and the lack of prompt and appropriate reactions of the 
authorities to the challenges of the global crisis is the main factor in prolonging 
the serious situation of Romania and the uncertainties that hang over the 
immediate future.  
The immobility of the Romanian economy management seems more obvious if 
we consider that, at global and European levels, countries have adopted anti-
crisis programs and measures, which essentially consisted of:  
•  Stimulating the domestic demand;  
•  Supporting the public investments; 
•   Temporary introduction of financial incentives by fiscal relaxing on the entire 
capital-salary-consumption axis, sometimes accompanied by postponement 
or tax exemption;  Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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•  Implementation of monetary incentives, primarily by reducing the benchmark 
interest rates by central banks;  
•  Harmonization of monetary policies for the purposes of the interest rate 
differential shrinkage, reducing the speculative cross-border capital flows;  
•  Financial state intervention for temporary acquisition of unconventional non-
performing assets;  
•  Massive injection of public capital to save important financial and banking 
institutions; 
•  Protection of public deposits;  
•  Additional social assistance programs for poor and unemployed people;  
•  Voluntary restraint of government bond sales;  
•  Better regulation and supervision of the financial system through new capital 
adequacy standards, particularly for financial institutions with international 
ramifications.  
Finding that the economies of these countries have responded positively to these 
measures, in the late 2009 being recorded clear signals of recovery, the 
discussions between the G20 world leaders, were focusing on the most 
appropriate "exit policy", i.e. the timing and procedures for withdrawing programs 
that support their economies, specific to crisis conditions (IMF, November 2009). 
Thus, there is a consensus on the fact that the "exit policy" should be correlated 
with the improvement of production in all these countries, without which adverse 
effects may occur, and that the coordination of these policies does not 
necessarily mean synchronizing. It was recommended that financial assistance 
should be withdrawn if and when economic fundamentals are restored, financial 
markets are stabilized, market mechanisms resume the functioning and market 
competition - somehow disturbed by the public interventions in financial and 
banking institutions - is restored.  
Besides taking into consideration these remedies, which have already had a 
positive impact on other countries, given its features, Romania, which has to go 
through two stages in order to turn back on the economic growth path (recovery 
+ rebound), respectively the nominal and real convergence with EU countries, 
must undertake actions as mentioned below:  
The Real Economy:  
•  Setting a significant financial package to support economic sectors in decline 
and the development of public works projects;   Romania’s External Debt Sustainability under Crisis Circumstances 
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•  Supporting the exports, as the main factor of foreign earnings growth, through 
appropriate trade, financial and banking tools;  
•  Implementing appropriate measures of institutional structural reform, 
including the resizing of the public sector;  
•  Internal and external steps to restore confidence in business climate and to 
reopen the appetite of foreign investors;  
•  Providing non-fiscal stimulus for targeting investments in priority sectors;  
•  Restoring conditions of fair competition in the market of goods and services.  
•  Increasing the absorption rate of EU structural funds. 
The Fiscal Policy:  
•  Fiscal consolidation, as top priority action;  
•  Adequate timing and steps to bring the public debt to lower levels;  
•  Fiscal adjustment by strengthening the primary balance.  
The Monetary Policy:  
•  Setting up a neutral authority for the supervision of primary capital market;  
•  Reducing the benchmark interest rate of the central bank;  
•  Reducing reserve requirements for commercial banks liabilities;  
•  Maintaining the exchange rate stability;  
•  Reforming the forex reserves management.  
The Financial and Banking System:  
•  Resuming the lending activity for business financing by the commercial 
banks;  
•  Sustaining the absorption of EU structural funds (project co-financing, pre-
financing); 
•  Measures to increase the quality of banking assets aimed at reducing the 
NPL ratio;  
•  Supporting the process of recapitalization of banks with state capital;  
•  Unblocking the payment system and reducing the arrears. Gh. Zaman, G. Georgescu 
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Any positive results of these measures depend on the internal effort in order to 
achieve a sustainable economic growth but also on the external context restoring 
- i.e. the sustainability of the global economic recovery, returning to the normal 
functioning of international capital markets - on the international oil and natural 
gas quotations and on the price of raw materials. 
Romania has a relatively high degree of international openness of the economy, 
which has to be accompanied by the efforts to sustain increasing production and 
underdeveloped domestic market. For this reason, a program to end the crisis 
effects on Romania and to re-launch the sustainable growth should be aimed at 
short and medium-term measures that contribute to strengthening the national 
sector of the Romanian economy by effectively using the opportunities arising 
from the global crisis itself through required restructuring that, until now, has 
induced but disadvantages. 
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